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THE GROWING-UP STICK
(A Book Review for Washington Lawyers)
JOHN N. RUPP*
MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, edited by Arthur
T. Vanderbilt. New York: Law Center of New York University for
The National Conference of Judicial Councils, 1949. Pp. xxxii + 752.
N A KITCHEN wall in our house hangs a serviceable and elegantly
Jpainted measuring stick upon which we mark, at more or less
regular intervals, the ascending heights of our children. This object is
known locally as "the growing-up stick," and it is both interesting and
useful as a permanent record of comparative statistics.
Now the law may be either an art or a science or both, but in any
case it is not exact and has few, if any, absolute standards, except, per-
haps, those ultimate goals which characterize any civilized legal system.
All of us know, however, that our legal system is not perfect and that
there is ample room for improvement. When we leave the substantive
law out of the picture and narrow our focus so that we look only at the
adjective law-the mechanics of putting the substantive law to work-
we shall probably find virtual unanimity among lawyers and laymen
alike that there is much now to do to improve our legal procedures. A
prime difficulty, however, has been that there were few standards to
apply; we had, as it were, no "growing-up stick."
The book at hand goes a considerable way to fill this need for a set
of standards, although the editor, Hon. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, and a former eminent
President of the American Bar Association, vigorously emphasizes the
fact that these are "the minimum standards needed in a practical way
to make our court procedure work in the twentieth century." These
standards have the firm support of the American Bar Association and
the National Conference of Judicial Councils. In the introduction to
the volume Judge Vanderbilt tells how and why these standards were
developed. The following excerpts will tell the story, at least in part:
One of the strangest phenomena in the law is the general indifference of
the legal profession to the technicalities, the anachronisms, and the delays
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in our procedural law. While our substantive law, dealing with legal rights,
has been developing from year to year, gradually adapting itself to the
changing needs of the times as the result of the unstinted efforts of judges,
lawyers, legislators, and administrative officials laboring in the workaday
world and of law professors reading and reflecting in their libraries, our
procedural law, dealing with the means of enforcing our legal rights, has
been relatively neglected. Various reasons have been assigned for this
singular attitude ... One suggestion is that it is a case of the shoemaker
neglecting his barefoot children; lawyers are so preoccupied with the sub-
stantive problems of their clients that they have little time to devote to the
great problem of ways and means in the law that we call judicial adminis-
tration and procedural law. Another suggestion, less complimentary to the
profession, is that while we are adept at developing the substantive law,
which concerns the public generally, we are loath to change our own world
of procedure, even in favor of something concededly better.
Whatever the reason may be for otir neglect, we cannot escape the un-
enviable contrast between the streamlined efficiency of the age of the
assembly line and of the scientific methods of modern technology and our
cumbersome and inefficient methods of utilizing our judicial machinery. In
many states modem business has to rely on outmoded procedures, some
medieval in origin, some reminiscent of the horse and buggy age, to enforce
its legal rights. It is not remarkable that businessmen have sensed far more
vigorously than most lawyers that a legal right is worthless if it cannot be
enforced, and therefore that procedural law is as important as substantive
law....
.. by and large laymen are not dissatisfied with our substantive law, but
merely with the technicalities of outmoded procedure and the interminable
and unjustifiable delays of the law and, occasionally and unfortunately, with
the shortcomings of conscience or of mind or the lack of good manners of a
judge. Yet in many places, the bench and the bar, which have the greatest
stake in public respect for the law as well as the primary responsibility for
its well-being, have neglected to take care of their birthright, leaving the
task to enlightened laymen with sufficient perspective to perceive the im-
portance to the body politic of courts that have the confidence of the public
and procedure that commands its respect.
In any period of unrest and of conflicting political, economic and social
ideas the law and the courts that administer it are peculiarly the target of
attacks by enemies both within and without the country. And, as I have just
said, these attacks center not on the substantive body of the law but on its
defects of procedure or of personnel. In 1937 these considerations combined
to induce a group of eminent judges, lawyers, and law professors in the
Section of Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association under
the leadership of Chief Judge John J. Parker of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to devote themselves to the formulation of
recommendations for the standards that were necessary to make our pro-
cedure workable and thus save our entire body of law from attack. These
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recommendations were embodied in seven reports dealing with judicial
administration, pretrial practice, trial practice, trial by jury and jury selec-
tion, the law of evidence, appellate practice and administrative agencies.
The recommendations of these seven reports were supported by a wealth of
authority. Basic to these reports was the conviction that the battle for im-
proved judicial procedure had to be fought on a nationwide front if the
battle was to be won in time, and this could be done successfully only with
the aid of the entire legal profession and of intelligent and public spirited
laymen....
The seven committee reports, as approved by the Section of Judicial
Administration, were distributed to every member of the American Bar
Association for study well in advance of the annual meeting at Cleveland
in 1938, and it was with the full knowledge of its members that in many
respects their own states fell short of complying with these minimum
requirements of sound judicial administration that the Association unan-
imously approved the reports with a single exception in appellate practice
that was recommitted to committee. A resolution was passed making the
advocacy of these recommendations a special program of the Association
and directing the constitution of committees of the Association in the several
states to press for the adoption of the recommendations.
The problems of judicial selection and tenure were not considered in the
seven reports, not because the Section and its committees were oblivious
to the fundamental importance of these topics, but because they were the
concern of a special committee of the Association and, even more to the
point, the Association had declared its policy the year before, in 1937, in
favor of a method of selecting judges that would ameliorate the unfortunate
effects of the direct election of judges....
Having arrived at this set of "minimum standards of judicial ad-
ministration," the American Bar Association's next step, only recently
completed, was to make a factual survey to determine the extent to
which each state was measuring up to these minimum practical stand-
ards. Elaborate questionnaires were carefully developed and entrusted
to selected reporters in each state for research and answer. (Who the
reporters were for the state of Washington does not appear.) The
answers were then tabulated and the summaries returned to the states
to be rechecked by new reporters. Thereafter the several chapters of
the present book were prepared, and the book was published. As Judge
Vanderbilt says, "The book simply records whether or not-or in what
degree-each state is complying with the standards of judicial and
procedural reform accepted by the American Bar Association .... To
such patriotic citizens as may be interested in these vital matters in a
time of unrest and doubt, this volume is tendered not as a literary effort
but as an arsenal of facts."
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Here, then, is the measuring stick. Let us stand our Washington
State system of judicial administration up against it and see how we
are "growing up."
For purposes of this article I shall assume that in all respects the
standards set up are sound and desirable. The inquiry will be directed
not at the standards, but at the measuring of our own system against
those standards.
Judicial Selection, Conduct, and Tenure
The first chapter is concerned with the selection, conduct, tenure,
removal and retirement of judges. It is doubtless placed first because
of the close and vital relation between the proper administration of
justice and the existence of a qualified and independent judiciary.
Upon the method of selecting judges, it is well known that the Ameri-
can Bar Association does not favor the system of popular election of
judges which is in force in a majority of the states. Judge Vanderbilt
refers to that system as "an unhappy legacy from the popular revolt of
a century ago often called the Jacksonian Revolution," and says:
That an elected judiciary has proved workable at all has been due to
such factors as the gradual extension of judicial terms, the movement for
nonpartisan judicial nominations, the impartial endorsements of judicial
candidates on the basis of professional standing by bar associations and
civic bodies and almost everywhere the appointment by governors of many
lawyers of high standing to fill the numirous vacancies in judicial office
for which they would never have been willing to campaign.
Briefly stated, the American Bar Association recommendation for
the "most acceptable substitute available for direct election of judges"
is that (1) vacancies be filled by executive appointment from a list
named by an independent agency composed of high judicial officers and
of selected citizens who hold no other public office; (2) (optional)
these appointees be confirmed by the State Senate; and (3) judges,
after a period of service, be eligible for reappointment periodically, if
still on the list; or be required periodically to run with no opposition,
the question before the voters being, "Shall Judge Blank be retained
in office?"
At present this plan is in effect only in Missouri, atlhough a somewhat
similar plan has operated since 1934 in California for appellate judges.
Washington is one of the thirty-five states in which-all judges are
selected by popular vote, although it is not one of the twenty-five of
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these in which judges run on a partisan ticket. "A representative group
of judges, lawyers and law school professors whose views were solicited
for the purposes of this survey" stated that in Washington three-fourths
of the trial judges and two-thirds of the appellate judges were "generally
satisfactory to the bar and the public." Just when this appraisal was
made does not appear, although it seems to have been sometime between
1942 and 1948.
In the length of judicial terms of office Washington appears to be
somewhat below the average; similarly in the matter of retirement
pensions.
It must be said that, assuming that the American Bar Association is
right, Washington's system of selection of judges falls far short of the
"standard."
Managing the Business of the Courts
In the matter of court administration, the first American Bar Associa-
tion standard is that there should be a unified judicial system, with
power and responsibility in one judge to assign judges to service so as
to relieve congested dockets and to utilize available judges to the best
advantage. Washington is said to have a "minimum number of elements
of external control," but there is no report of any sentiment in this
state for more of such control, and one gathers that our system works
quite well.
A strong and representative Judicial Council is the second standard
recommended, and Washington is one of the fifteen states that measure
up to this standard. It is one of the seventeen states that compile ade-
quate judicial statistics, and thus it meets the third standard.
I think we can safely say that in the matter of properly managing
the business of the courts, the state stands in the upper one-third.
Rule Making
It is recommended that practice and procedure in the courts be
regulated by rules of the court (not by statute) and that the courts be
given full rule-making power. Washington is one of the fourteen states
in which the court of last resort has complete rule-making power. Our
Supreme Court has had this power since 1925, but it has not yet fully
exercised it, i.e., many statutes regulating procedure have not yet been
superseded by rules of court. However, Washington is one of twenty-
six states in which the present system of rule-making is reported to be
satisfactory.
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Selection and Service of Juries
The American Bar Association recommends: (1) that jurors be
selected by commissioners appointed by the courts; (2) that in metro-
politan centers a system like the "Cleveland system" be adopted to
select healthy, literate, and intelligent persons for jury duty; (3) that
voir dire examination should be conducted by both court and counsel
in the manner set out in Rule 47 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure; and (4) that in long trials at least one alternate juror be em-
paneled.
Twenty-four states use the recommended method of selecting jurors
by commissioners appointed by the courts. Washington does not employ
this system, but Washington's system (said to be, "judges select jurors
from list prepared by county assessors and other sources") is not criti-
cized, as are systems in which the jurors are picked by city mayors or
county commissioners.
The recommended Cleveland "key number" system is not in use
here, but it is used in parts of only five states. It employs fairly careful
screening processes involving questionnaires and personal interviews
of prospective veniremen.
The recommended method for voir dire examination is substantially
followed in Washington, which fact puts it among the twenty-nine
states which measure up to this standard.
As to the recommendation on alternate jurors, Washington is one of
the eight states which permit alternate jurors only in criminal cases,
while twenty-four states permit alternates in all cases. At least, how-
ever, we are not among the sixteen which have no provision at all for
alternate jurors.
To sum up on this matter of jury selection, Washington seems to
measure up fairly well with the "standards" set up, except that we fall
under the editor's general indictment that, "Much remains to be done
for the improvement of the mode of investigating the competency of
the prospective juror."
Pretrial Conferences.
Pretrial hearings or conferences, before a judge, are recommended
in all metropolitan areas and are suggested in other areas "if justified
by local conditions." The time for such hearings is left to the individual
needs of each jurisdiction. It is also recommended that "a pretrial hear-
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ing need not involve a disclosure of the details of proof which counsel
prefer not to disclose."
I shall not add here to the rather extensive literature on the subject
of pretrial conferences and hearings. Opinions on the efficacy of pretrial
procedures vary all the way from the idea that they are utterly useless,
to the notion that they are the "wonder drug" that will cure all our ills,
result in profitable settlements of all our lawsuits, and give us all more
time to be bedevilled by law review editors into writing articles which
will never be read. Somewhere in between these extremes lies the truth,
and only the passage of time and the growth of experience will reveal it.
The recommendations of the American Bar Association and, es-
pecially, the adoption of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure gave a strong impetus to pretrial procedures, and now twenty-
nine states provide for such hearings or conferences. Washington is one
of these. On the books at least we are in conformity with the recom-
mendations. I have the impression, however, that "pretrial" has been
rather a slow-starter here and that much more experience with it is
needed before the bench and bar generally come to regard it as a valu-
able adjunct to the judicial process. The book reports that it is very
highly regarded in those places where it has been in common use for a
substantial period of time, and it cannot be denied that potentially it
is a very useful device for the simplification of issues, the settling of
facts about which there is no real dispute, the stabilizing of trial dockets,
and, incidentally, the settling of lawsuits.
Trial Practice
Because a summary or a paraphrasing of the recommendations on the
very important subject of trial practice would not be effective, I set out
these recommendations in full:
(1) That the common-law concept of the function and authority of
the trial judge be uniformly restored in the states which have
departed therefrom.
(2) That after the evidence has been. closed and counsel have con-
cluded their arguments to the jury, the trial judge should instruct
the jury orally as to the law of the case, and should have power
to advise them as to the facts by summarizing and analyzing the
evidence and commenting upon the weight and credibility of the
evidence or upon any part of it, always leaving the final decision
on questions of fact to the jury.
(3) That the trial judge should be at all times the governor of the
trial in the sense of actively, and firmly when necessary, requir-
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ing that the proceedings be conducted with dignity, decorum and
the avoidance of waste of time.
(4) That the provisions of the new federal Rules 26 to 37 relating
to discovery should be adopted iin all the states.
(5) That the trial court should be authorized, in its discretion to
submit specific issues to the jury to be considered in connection
with a general verdict, in accordance with the practice prescribed
by Rule 49 of the new federal rules.
(6) That the trial judge should have power to grant a partial new
trial where in his judgment the several issues are clearly and
fairly separable.
(7) That the practice of granting judgment non obstante veredicto
be uniformly adopted, and that it be extended to authorize judg-
ment on motion, in accordance with the original motion for a
directed verdict, after the jury has disagreed and upon discharge,
as provided for in Rule 50 of the new federal rules.
(8) That after the trial of a law suit has begun, dismissal without
prejudice by voluntary non-pros be permitted only in the legally
reviewable discretion of the trial judge.
(9) That in law cases involving complicated fact issues, there may
well be reference to a special master or auditor in advance of a
jury trial with the submission of his report for consideration by
the jury .... ; that in equity and non-jury law cases the report
should be accepted by the court as to the facts unless clearly
erroneous, but nevertheless with power in the trial judge to
adopt or modify or reject the report in whole or in part or, in
his discretion, to receive further evidence with regard to the
facts found, or to re-commit the report with instructions. In jury
actions the findings of the referee, special master or auditor
should be made admissible as evidence of the matters found and
be read to the jury subject to the ruling of the court upon any
objection in point of law which may be made to the report (see
new federal Rule 53).
(10) That the practice as to issuing preliminary injunctions should
be in accordance with that outlined in the new federal Rule 65
which in substance forbids the issuance of preliminary injunc-
tions without a hearing, but permits a temporary restraining
order when necessary to obviate irreparable injury.
The first three of these recommendations are stated to be the most
important of the ten, the first and third being fundamental concepts and
the second being "directed specifically to one vital phase in the attain-
ment of these fundamentals."
All of us know the Washington rule and practice that the trial judge
does not have the common-law right and duty to "comment on the
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evidence." Thus Washington does not meet the second standard set out
above. Neither, however, do thirty-five other states. We do not even
permit the judge to sum up or summarize the evidence and in this we
are joined by only nineteen other states.
As to standard (4), quoted above, on discovery, the reporters report
that Washington is one of the sixteen states which have discovery rules
"substantially similar" to the two federal rules cited.
Standard (5) relating to the submission of specific issues to the jury
to be considered in connection with a general verdict is, the reporters
say, complied with in Washington. Washington also provides for a
special verdict. Both of these are in the discretion of the judge, which
is in accord with the recommendation, and is the rule in the large ma-
jority of states.
Washington practice does not comply with standard (6), since we
require that a new trial must be on all the issues of the case. Here we
are in a twenty-two state minority.
Recommendation (7), relating to judgments n.o.v., is generally com-
plied with in our practice, as it is in the majority of jurisdictions.
Washington permits a plaintiff to dismiss or take a nonsuit as a
matter of right at the trial before the defendant enters on his defense.
Thus Washington does not comply with the standard set up by recom-
mendation (8). The Washington rule is unique, but twenty-four other
states permit voluntary dismissal or nonsuit at various stages of the
trial.
Recommendation (9) relates to masters' reports in jury and nonjury
cases. The Washington practice is said to conform to the recommenda-
tion in jury cases, but not to conform in nonjury cases because the
master's findings of fact are persuasive only. In the jury case situation
we are one of a fifteen-state "good minority"; in the nonjury case we
are in an eighteen-state "bad minority."
Recommendation (10), on preliminary injunctions, is complied with
by this state and thirty-seven others.
To sum up, it appears that we are in accord with recommendations
(4), (5), (7), part of (9) and (10). Washington does not comply with
recommendations (2), (6), (8), and part of (9). How we stand on (1)
and (3) is a matter of opinion.
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Traffic Courts and Justice of the Peace Courts
The bulk of this chapter is devoted to a consideration of progress
made in the adoption of fifty-seven specific recommendations for the
improvement of traffic courts made by George Warren in his 1942
publication Traffic Courts (the fourth volume of this Judicial Admin-
istration Series of books). The fifty-seven recommendations are dealt
with in the present volume under nine headings.
The first heading relates to the extent and uniformity of motor vehicle
statutes. Here Washington is in practically full conformity with the
recommendations, since it has statutes requiring certificates of title,
drivers' licenses, financial responsibility, and a statute thoroughly
regulating traffic.
Secondly, it i§ recommended that only lawyers be eligible to serve
on the traffic court bench. Here we do not conform except in larger
cities.
Third, it is recommended that "dignified" physical facilities be pro-
vided for traffic courts. Compliance with this recommendation varies
with the locality. Seattle, Olympia, and Richland in this state are
specially mentioned as "converts" to the recommendation.
The remainder of the recommendations deal with such points as
these: that the traffic "ticket" serve also as the court complaint; that
each police officer have certain designated days for court appearance;
that traffic cases be separated, for trial, from "police court" cases; that
there be a special traffic violations bureau; that the "Michigan uniform
traffic ticket" be used; that "costs" be not added to the fine; that ade-
quate records be kept on "repeaters;" and that "ticket fixing" be
eliminated by various recommended devices.
The book is of no great aid in determinihg accurately how this state
stands with respect to these recommendations, and I list them here
simply as a convenient means of again bringing this whole important
matter to the attention of the Bar.
There is also a section of the book devoted to the justice courts and
to suggestions for their improvement. No specific recommendations are
set forth, however. I suppose that all Washington judges, lawyers, and
justices of the peace agree that our system of justice courts and the
procedure therein are badly in need of an overhaul. Some day we will
do the job. It is perhaps some consolation, though a rather wry one, to
know that it is a task still to be done by nearly every other state in the
Union.
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The Law of Evidence
The chapter on the law of evidence sets out fifteen minimum stand-
ards. I shall condense, combine, and paraphrase them.
First, it is said that error in admitting or rejecting evidence ought
not to be ground for a new trial unless the appellate court believes that
the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Also, in nonjury cases, a
new trial should not be granted for error in the admission of evidence
if there is substantial evidence to support the findings unless the findings
are based on the evidence erroneously admitted. Washington complies
with this standard.
It is recommended that a formal "exception" to admission or rejec-
tion of evidence should not be required. Here again Washington com-
plies.
On survivor's testimony, the recommendation is that an interested
party should be permitted to testify to transactions with a deceased
person and that declarations of a decedent should be admitted in evi-
dence if the judge finds that they were made in good faith and on the
decedent's personal knowledge. Washington does not comply with this
standard-only six states do. The majority rule is criticized as "an
anachronism and an obstruction to the truth, since its details are highly
technical and have no relation to the psychology of veracity."
It is also recommended that the declarations of a deceased or insane
person should be received in evidence if .the trial judge finds that the
declarant is dead or insane and that he made the declaration in good
faith on his own personal knowledge before commencement of the
action. Only six states have this rule. Washington does not.
On privileged communications the North Carolina rule is recom-
mended, to the effect that the trial judge may require a physician to
disclose a privileged communication from a patient if the judge finds
that the disclosure is necessary for the proper administration of justice.
Washington does not comply with the standard, since it is one of the
thirty-one states which recognize the physician-patient privilege.
It is also recommended that privilege be not extended to accountants,
social workers, or journalists. Washington has not extended the'rule
to any of these occupations.
The rule of the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act is set up
as a standard. Washington is one of the 16 states that have this rule.
It is recommended that an ordinary witness be allowed to state his
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conclusion with respect to ordinary matters, subject to explanation.
Washington is one of twenty-six jurisdictions which do ndt permit this
form of "opinion evidence."
On expert testimony it is recommended that the principles (too long
to be set down here) embodied in the Model Expert Testimony Act and
in the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence (202-216)
be adopted. Washington and forty-four other states still follow the
"outmoded" common-law principles on this point.
The provisions of new federal Rule 44 on certified copies of official
records are recommended. Washington is one of thirty-five states that
comply with this standard.
Adoption of the principles of the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign
Law Act is recommended. Washington is in compliance. Only ten states
follow the criticized common-law rules on this point.
It is recommended that oaths be administered to witnesses separately
and in a dignified and understandable way. Washington complies with
these two standards; many states do not.
Abolition of the "scintilla rule" is recommended. Washington and
most other states do not have this criticized rule.
It is recommended that the provisions of the new federal Rule 43 (b)
on the examination of hostile or adverse parties as witnesses should be
adopted. Washington is one of the thirty states which have provisions
similar to Rule 43 (b).
On balance then, we do not look too bad. We comply with nine of the
standards and we fail to comply with five of them. In our noncompli-
ances we are joined by a majority of the jurisdictions. A good many of
our compliances are quite recent and are due to our having an active
Judicial Council and an alert Supreme Court, as well as a Legislature
which has shown itself willing to adopt progressive legislation.
Appellate Practice
There are sixteen standards set up for the improvement of appellate
practice.
First is the pious recommendation that appeals from inferior courts
(e.g., justice courts) by way of full retrial in higher courts should be
avoided by improving the quality of the inferior courts. On this I .do
not comment.
Next is a recommendation that pecuniary limits should be placed on
appeals-as-a-matter-of-right. No attempt is made to say what these
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limits should be. Washington has such limits, although they are quite
low.
It is recommended that an appeal should be effected by filing a simple
notice of appeal in the lower court. Washington complies, as do most
states.
On supersedeas bonds it is recommended that the amount be fixed
by the court so as adequately to secure to the respondent the benefit of
his judgment. Washington's requirement of double the amount of the
judgment is criticized.
It is recommended that assignments of error be required to be pointed
out only in the briefs. Washington complies.
Typewritten records, instead of printed records, are recommended.
Here again we are in compliance, as are thirty-one other states.
That the originals of exhibits and other papers be sent up in the
appellate record is recommended. Washington complies, except for its
practice about transcripts.
The abolition of the abstract is recommended, and Washington com-
plies. But it is also recommended (and we do not comply) that such
matters in the record as the parties desire to bring to the court's atten-
tion should be set forth in appendices to the brief, either by summarized
statement or quotation. The reason for this is that, when there is only
one typewritten copy of the record, all the judges will likely not see
the matters deemed to be important.
It is recommended that, except in the case of an agreed statement,
the record be set up in question-and-answer form. Washington records
are commonly in this form.
It is recommended that either the trial or appellate court be em-
powered to correct the record at any time so as to present the case fully
and correctly. Washington permits the appellate court to do this.
It is recommended that "the number of pages in any brief taxable
as costs should be limited by rule of court." Washington has a descend-
ing cost scale, "the effectiveness of which in achieving the purposes of
the recommendation [i.e., shorter briefs] may be questioned."
The restoration of the importance of oral argument is urged.
Studies are recommended to cope with the problem of "one-man"
decisions on appeal. Washington is characterized as a one-man decision
state, since it is said that cases are assigned in regular sequence to
Supreme Court judges for opinion writing. Several devices to insure full
participation of several judges are suggested.
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Memorandum opinons are recommended where no new principle or
novel application of law is involved and the decision is controlled by
certain statutes or cases. Washington does not comply-along with
twenty-seven other states. This is referred to as "discouraging."
It is recommended that findings of fact should have the same effect
in all nonjury cases on appeal-whether at law or in equity Washington
complies, when there are findings.
It is recommended that the appellate court should have power to enter
or order the proper judgment without a new trial where the record
shows as a matter of law what the judgment should be. Washington is
in accord.
Finally it is recommended that, when error affects only a part of the
case, the appellate court should have power to remand for a new trial
on that part only, if such remand will not prejudice the substantial
rights of any litigant. Here Washington does not comply and is in the
mmority
To sum up this chapter, it apears that Washington is m accord with
nine of the recommended minimum standards and that it does not
comply with six of them.
State Administrative Agencies and Tribunals
The last chapter in the book deals with state administrative agencies
and tribunals and takes for its standards those set up in the Model
State Administrative Procedure Act, adopted m 1946 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
The standards deal with the organization of the agencies, the exercise
of their rule-making power, their adjudications in specific causes, their
hearing procedures and rules, the separation of admimstrative, prose-
cuting and judicial functions, and the judicial review of their orders.
It would be impossible, in the space allotted to me, to discuss these
matters in detail and to apply the discussion to the various agencies of
this state. Suffice it to say that there are standards set up in the model
act and that in many instances we do not comply with them.
Conclusion
Having completed this process of measuring our state's system of
judicial administration against this "growing-up stick" of minmum
standards, I am perforce reminded of the following colloquy-
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Hamlet: Good lads how do ye both?
Rosencrantz: As the indifferent children of the earth.
Guildenstern: Happy in that we are not over happy;
On Fortune's cap we are not the very button.
Hamlet: Nor the soles of her shoe?
Rosencrantz: Neither, my lord.
Lest, however, this "gentleman's grade of C" lull any of us into a
pleasant sense of security or satisfaction with the "progress" already
made, let us again remember that the standards here set up are "the
minimum standards needed in a practical way to make our court pro-
cedure work in the twentieth century."
Defects in the adjective law do much to cause popular dissatisfaction
with the Bench and Bar. While defects exist we cannot rest.
